These questions should be answered by current research, and thus our perception of the overall problem 'of the role of animals in the aetiology of asthma and what we can do to reduce the problem is likely to change rapidly over the next few years.
Quantum physics and the philosophy of medicine Philosophy has many meanings, depending upon the philosopher: the philosophy of medicine means most commonly physicians' estimates of -themselves and of their professional activity. This in turn is set in the context of how humans see themselvesin an overworked neologism, the 'existential' contextand that context changes over time. For many centuries the philosophy of medicine was that of Sir Thomas Browne: Christian, except when it was Jewish or Islamic, but in any event suspended between the material and the spiritual. When science became the senior oracle, medicine foundand still findsitself differently suspended, between the formulations of nineteenth century reductionism and 'humanistic psychology': how patients feel.
If we are to be devotees of science, however, we incur the responsibility of keeping up with itnot only in our own acre, but in general. For the vast majority of physicians the familiar objects of science are Darwinian biology, Helmholzian mind and Democritean reductionism: there is quite enough to learn in the middle ground, without pursuing science down below the electron or up and out into cosmology. Unfortunately, the familiar objects of scientific faith are the furniture not of this century but of the last. They are also part of our patients' mental furniture, explaining why they regard sickness and death, and our professional activity, very differently from Sir Thomas Browne's patients.
There was an austere beauty about the reductionist science of, say, T H Huxleyit called for an end of childish things, heuristic integrity, stoicism in the face of a coherent and non-anthropocentric universe, a burning of intellectual teddy bears. True, one may hold religious or philosophical opinions, and assert the undemonstrable, provided one does not assert the demonstrably false. The science to which the oracular appeal was made was a seamless reductionism: physical events are reducible to interactive properties of matter-energybiological events are wholly reducible to the interaction of physical systemsmind and human experience, though having a private value for mankind, are wholly reducible to the neurology and neurochemistry of biological systems.
Whether this schema is a 'philosophy' or not, it has clear existential overtones. It affects the attitude of patients to the unmanageables in life; since we as physicians attempt to manage those unmanageables, it affects the backdrop of our practice. In Browne's time, the patient viewed himself as an immortal soul, and his physician viewed him likewise. In the era of reductionism and oracular science, Joe Blow, whether or not he goes to church, views himself most vivdly as an eraseable programme on which the plug will one day be pulled. The stern existential Puritanism of Democritean rationalists is a healthy environment but chilly to inhabit. Yet where else, except to a revival of denial mythologies, could one turn?
In fact, science has already turned the wheel, not by relaxing its demand for intellectual integrity but by insisting on it. Starting in the 1 920s, physics remorselessly set about demolishing the Democritean-mechanistic model because it did not fit the experimental data. At the point where the math became difficult and the models unvisualizable, biology, medicine and psychology simply lost contact. Hard-liners, whose adherence to the stoicism and nononsensism of reductionist science had cost them dear in coming to terms with some very ego-dystonic ideas, treated the new work as speculative metaphysics which would collapse when reduction was more complete. It has not done so.
One reason for us to re-engage medicine in philosophy is that the world-model given out by science is in a state of rapid change. In fact, it is split in a quite unprecedented manner between physics and cosmology on one hand and all the rest of the field, including biology and psychology, on the other. Biology develops historical evolutionary models which incorporate a time arrow, and neurology investigates the generation of mental activity by brains. But these are both Newtonian models. For the physicist, space-time exists en bloc. Moreover its most plausible mathematical models, which generate experimentally verifiable results, are non-Democritean.
As against a world full of real objects, many physical models, such as that of Bohm (1981) , see the natural world as analogous to one of those videogame screens upon which we see simulated objects (Comfort 1981) . The objects on the screen obey cause-and-effect laws (if they collide they destroy each other): given a 3-dimensional holographic display, they would look very like real game-pieces. But there are no objects there: they are composed of pulses generated by a black box which are non-local with respect to the blobs on the screen and bear no transformative resemblance to what we see. The 'objects' are being synthesized in our imaging system. There is no problem with a real videogamebut protons, electrons, molecules and a fortiori our brains are, in the Bohmian model, themselves blips on the screen. Mentation is accordingly an activity of the game-piecesas swallowing other pieces is an activity of Pac-Man: in which case, who, in von Helmholz's model, is doing the thinking?
This problem ('the hyperloop') is only the start. The machine and the ghost are not only equally ghostly, they interact in a recursive fashion. In many quantum contexts, what we observe does not square mathematically with the complete state functionwe have to infer either that observation 'collapses the wave-function' by chopping a probability distribution, or that events a and b both occur, but we become correlated with one result, a or b, and 'time bifurcates', as in the many-worlds model of Everett (De Witt & Graham 1973) .
The reason that there is now a very similar 'two worlds' model in science, with most of us still unaware of the intellectual difficulties of standing pat, and physics inhabiting a different region of discourse, is quite simply the difficulty of following dense mathematical argument. We watch the physicists rather as a crowd watches an air circus. Another is the extreme difficulty of empathizing the result. Physicists cannot empathize it themselves. Medicine, however, can draw certain conclusions.
First, 'natural philosophy' has regrouped itself. All the key problems, such as particle versus field models, and the relation of observed to observer, were posed by the Eleatics, but the answers will now come from classical hard experiment. That aspect of philosophy has re-entered science in earnest. Second, further progress in physics now depends on 'parasitic analysis' of the observing system (using our built-in computer to analyse its own performance). Accordingly, a place must be set for the neurologist. Third, the observed or real world is a highly-transformed artefact on which our brains impose Kant's a prioris, including the (wholly subjective) 'flow of time'. Fourth, when all this has shaken down, and then filtered down, as Darwin, Newton, von Helmholz, Huxley and the other Great Reductionists have done to form an existential consensus which is 'scientific' and affects how we feel about ourselves, the results will be far-reaching. Whether the new selfestimate against which we live will be any more ego-syntonic than Sartrian absurdity is anyone's guess, but it will be different. The process will also take longer: what the reductionists were saying was within the normal pattern of subjective experience, not counter to it, and far easier to expound. One might guess, in shorthand terms, that we and our patients will come to sound a great deal more Buddhist -Buddhist philosophy has been thinking for nearly 3000 years on the lines which now seem to be emerging mutatis mutandis from physics. Would it affect the practice of medicine ? Well, the change from mediaeval pietism to scientific rationalism affected our basic concern as well as our armamentarium. When a Hindu psychiatrist suggests that gender dysphoria or obsessions may represent incomplete deletion of a 'past life' we look down our noses, but given 'en bloc spacetime' is the idea odder than the bifurcation of time at each quantum choice? I do not say that the Hindu is correct, but we may well face the demolition of scientific dogmata as wounding to orthodoxy and amour propre as this would be, or as was the subversion of Galen's ideas by the Renaissance. We may have no inclination for higher mathematics, or for joining the wild yogis of physics and cosmology: at the same time, if only because it monitors human concerns, it would be good if medicine were up with the hounds.
It has been remarkedby Neils Bohr, I believe that anyone who is not shocked by the conclusions of quantum physics has not understood them. They certainly imply that the structure of the real world is grossly counterintuitive, that the middle-order experience in which we live is artefactual, and that, as J B S Haldane suggested, 'nature is not only odder than we think but odder than we can think'. We are left with a world composed of state-functions which, when expressed in wave-mechanical formalisms, generate a superpositional logic in which a and not-a may coexist. Nor is this confined to recondite experiments with particles: anyone who possesses three sheets of polaroid can verify the nondistributive character of a coherent superposition. A happy hunting ground, perhaps, for mathematicians with overengineered brains, but not a source of readilyperceived world models like those of Galileo or T H Huxley.
Why should new discoveries shock us, however? Chiefly they do soas Darwin and Huxley didwhen they demand of us the renunciation of certainties. The certainties demolished by Darwin and Huxley were those of fundamentalism; the certainties attacked by quantum mechanics are those as dear to 'sound' science as was Bishop Usher's chronology to 'sound' Victorian Protestantism: that mind is generated by brain, not transduced by it, that local phenomena exist, and that the seamless reductionist-mechanist shirt is indeed seamless. Quantum theorists approach without prejudice questions such that the very fact of raising them in any other discipline than mathematical physics would constitute one a metaphysical heretic, a 'soft' theoristin plain words, a Charlie. We have drawn the wagons round some of these articles of doctrine, as did the 16th-century Church around the pre-Copernican universe.
Nullius in verba, and most of us simply do not have the time or the mathematics to enter the disputation over the implications of quantum mechanics for our analysis of mind. A world in which there are no 'things', and all phenomena are interconnected via non-locality and the quantum interconnectedness, will not look very different at patient-care level (it is the same reality described in a different algebra), and we may be tempted to let the physicists argue whether the Einstein-Rosen-Podolsky effect means that particles are not separate objects, or that free will is an illusion, or that time divides at each of our choices ('contrafactual definiteness fails'). Even biology, where interconnectedness might stand conventional ideas of stochastic evolution on their head if it extends into macrosystems, has not felt the draught yet. The trouble is that what was 'philosophy' is now experimental science, and a number of sacred cowsepiphenomenal mind, the human experience of separate positional identity, and even the reality of the experiential 'flow of time' -have wandered into a free-fire zone. A bullet aimed at something elsesay the nature of 'spin' in particlescould lay one of them low at any minute. The worrying thing, however, is that when the physicists mathematize all this, there is hardly a neurologist or a psychiatrist around to carry back the news even if he or she does not enter the debate. Moreover, even if we do not hear the fatal shot, our patients will: their garbled version may be existentially more influential in shaping the 'new model of the universe' as inhabited by Joe Blow than difficult mathematical proofs like Bell's theorem. Popularizers are already beginning to appear (Zukav 1979) and we might well join our patients and read them, simply to get an idea of what is afoot. Medicine always acquires the colour of its time, and to do so it needs to keep a constant finger on science at large.
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